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ABSTRACT 
We present a theoretical framework of family ownership as a driver of the heterogeneity 
(between-firm differences) and variability (within-firm differences over time) of absorptive 
capacity (AC). Building on our analysis of the multiple dimensions of family owner influence on 
firm behavior and the mechanisms that can shape the firm willingness and ability to acquire, 
assimilate, transform, and exploit external knowledge, we introduce the concepts of motivation 
gap and implementation gap to explain why, paradoxically, family ownership can cause both 
upward and downward divergences in AC. Our contingency framework identifies conditions 
under which the positive and negative effects of family ownership on AC are likely to prevail and 
adds a temporal perspective suggesting that AC varies depending on the duration of family 
ownership and ownership succession. 
 
Practitioner Points: 
 Our model explains two important implications of family ownership, emotional 
attachment and power concentration, that affect family firms’ ability and willingness 
to acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit external knowledge. 
 Our model suggests that both ability and willingness can cause poor performance in 
incorporating and using external knowledge.  
 Family firm owners and managers can use the framework to “map” their own firm’s 
situation and understand their strengths and weaknesses with regard to absorptive 
capacity, and identify corrective actions to address motivation and implementation 
gaps identified through the model. 
 Finally, the model offers some valuable practical insights about the effects of family 
owners’ tenure and succession. Knowledge about these effects can be valuable to 
guide firm-specific discussions about when ownership succession should take place. 
 
Keywords: absorptive capacity, emotional attachment, family firms, power concentration, 
motivation gap, implementation gap 
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INTRODUCTION 
In increasingly dynamic and competitive environments, the capacity to acquire, assimilate, 
transform, and exploit external knowledge—that is, absorptive capacity (AC; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990)—is crucial for firms to innovate, renew their competitive advantage, and sustain 
performance (Lewin et al., 2011; Schildt et al., 2012; Vasudeva and Anand 2011; Volberda et al., 
2010; Wales et al., 2013). Yet despite the overall agreed importance of AC, academic studies as 
well as anecdotal evidence reveal substantial heterogeneity among firms with regard to their 
willingness and ability to foster their firms’ AC (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Jansen et al., 
2005; Lane et al., 2001; Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008). Hence, research has started to investigate 
firm-level drivers of AC, such as the firm’s existing knowledge, managerial capabilities, and 
cognitive frames (see Lane et al., 2006; Todorova and Durisin, 2007; Volberda et al., 2010).  
However, while this research has revealed the importance of managers, including their 
cognition, motivation, actions, and interactions (Volberda et al., 2010), as important antecedents 
of firm-level AC, we still lack knowledge about how owners’ attributes affect firm-level AC. 
This is an important gap in research, as prior literature has convincingly argued and shown that 
owners oftentimes exploit their influence to impact important firm-level decisions such as those 
related to innovation (Carney, 2005; Chrisman and Patel, 2012). Owners might influence AC 
through the specifics strategic priorities that they pose to the firm (Kochhar and David, 1996), 
their investment horizons (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000), or through their, often path-dependent, 
influence on organizational structure, routines, and culture (König et al., 2013). One type of 
ownership that is of particular importance is family ownership, given the prevalence of firms with 
family owners in any economy worldwide (La Porta et al., 1999) and their idiosyncrasies that 
mainly go back to wealth concentration (Anderson and Reeb, 2004) and their emotional 
considerations (Cruz et al., 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). For instance, prior research 
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external knowledge (e.g., Casprini et al., 2017; Chirico and Salvato, 2014; Chrisman and Patel, 
2012; König et al., 2013; Kotlar et al., 2013; Patel and Fiet, 2011), but the direction of this 
influence as well as the precise mechanisms remain unclear since this literature is replete with 
opposing perspectives and contradictory results (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2015a).  Hence, we pose 
the following research questions: What are the mechanisms through which family ownership 
influences the level of firm AC? Under which conditions is family ownership beneficial or 
detrimental to potential and realized AC? How do those relationships change over time? 
We identify two major theoretical mechanisms through which family ownership can drive the 
heterogeneity and temporal variations in firm AC. First, family ownership can produce emotional 
attachment in the form of seeing the firm as “our business” (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Such 
emotional aspects are likely to alter the firm’s strategic goals (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007; Patel and Chrisman, 2014) and determine which knowledge should be brought 
into the firm and which should be utilized (Ben-Oz and Greve, 2012; Lane et al., 2006). Second, 
family ownership can influence the hierarchical structure and informal social relations within the 
firm (Cannella et al., 2014; Cruz et al., 2010; Patel and Cooper, 2014), setting the constraints of 
which type of knowledge can be acquired, assimilated, transformed, and exploited (Lane et al., 
2006; Mason and Leek, 2008; Sammarra and Biggiero, 2008; Todorova and Durisin, 2007).  
Starting from this framework, we explain how firm ownership can be an important driver of 
so far unexplained heterogeneity and temporal variations in AC (Lane et al., 2006; Nag and 
Gioia, 2012; Volberda et al., 2010) and contribute to literatures on AC and family firms in three 
major ways. First, we shed light on the socio-emotional mechanisms underlying the effect of firm 
ownership on the acquisition and assimilation (i.e., building up potential AC) as well as the 
transformation and exploitation (i.e., realized AC) of external knowledge (e.g., Huy, 2012) and 
we disentangle the firm’s ability to build (potential and realized) AC from its willingness or 
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Levinthal, 1990), it has not been directly addressed. Second, we examine how family owners, 
depending on their emotional attachment and on how they exert their power, can exert 
heterogeneous influence on their firm and thus on AC. We thereby  address the lack of theoretical 
consensus around existing “umbrella” constructs capturing the family owners’ influence on the 
business, such as “familiness” (Habbershon et al. , 2003) and “socio-emotional wealth” (Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007)
1
 commonly used in family firm research (e.g., Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 
2014). This enables identifying important contingency factors and reconciling contradictory 
theory and evidence on innovation in family firms (Calabrò et al., 2018; De Massis et al., 2013a). 
While our analysis focuses particularly on family ownership, the mechanisms underlying the 
acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and exploitation of external knowledge that we bring to 
light could explain other firm capabilities and the influence of other types of owners. Finally, we 
advance the current understanding of inter-temporal differences in firm AC. Cohen and 
Levinthal’s (1990) seminal definition emphasizes the developmental, cumulative, and path-
dependent nature of AC, but most theoretical and empirical analyses adopt a static approach and 
tend to take the dynamic mechanisms underlying the acquisition and exploitation of external 
knowledge for granted (e.g., Lane et al., 2006; Volberda et al., 2010). We challenge and extend 
this view by introducing dynamic and inter-temporal considerations on how emotional 
attachment and the power concentration of family owners change over time and how these 
variations can disrupt the development of firm AC.  
                                                            
1 While the concept of familiness bundles various resources that are idiosyncratic to family firms, the concept of 
socio-emotional wealth summarizes a variety of different non-financial goals ascribed to family ownership; 
while influential and useful for many research endeavours, both concepts suffer from a lack of precision of how 
precisely the family exerts influence on the company (e.g., Chua, Chrisman, and De Massis, 2015; Miller and Le 
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ANTECEDENTS OF AC AND THE ROLE OF FIRM OWNERSHIP  
Firm-internal drivers of AC 
AC is the ability to acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit external knowledge to extend or 
renew existing knowledge stocks and use such resources to innovate and gain a competitive 
advantage (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2006; Zahra and George, 2002). In the 
following, we build on Zahra and George’s (2002) distinction between potential AC, which refers 
to the knowledge funnel that determines which external information crosses the firm’s boundaries 
(i.e., knowledge acquisition and assimilation, Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Van den Bosch et al., 
1999), and realized AC, which refers to transforming the externally acquired knowledge into 
valuable outputs (i.e., knowledge transformation and exploitation, Narasimhan et al., 2006; Tsai, 
2001). This distinction enables clarifying their different antecedents and underlying mechanisms 
related to distinct firm capabilities with regard to the acquisition and exploitation of external 
knowledge (Zahra and George, 2002). 
More specifically, potential AC entails departing from existing knowledge bases towards 
openness to broad and potentially distant knowledge sources, leading to uncertainty on the scope 
and complexity of external knowledge (Benner and Tushman, 2002; Zahra and George, 2002). 
The underlying capabilities are primarily based on decision-making (Jansen et al., 2005; 
Torodova and Durisin, 2007) and on processes that enable identifying and evaluating externally 
generated knowledge to support analyzing, processing, interpreting, and understanding the 
information embedded in this knowledge (Zahra and George, 2002). Conversely, realized AC 
requires integrating newly acquired knowledge into the existing knowledge base and depends on 
the firm’s capabilities to refine, extend, and leverage this resource stock (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Zahra and George, 2002). Firms combine acquired external knowledge with existing 
knowledge stocks and this is integrated into the cognitive frames of the organizational members 
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levels of uncertainty about the new knowledge compared to potential AC (Jansen et al., 2006; 
Lewin et al., 2011). This insight is also found in research on innovation and organizational 
learning, distinguishing between variance enhancing (i.e., exploration) and variance reducing 
(i.e., exploitation) activities (e.g., Benner and Tushman, 2002; March, 1991).  
Research on the antecedents of AC traditionally emphasizes structural factors referring to the 
characteristics of prior knowledge, environmental conditions, and learning relationships (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990; Foss et al., 2010; Lane et al., 2006; Van Wijk et al., 2008; Volberda et al., 
2010). For example, considerable attention is paid to such factors as the depth and breadth of the 
firm’s existing knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2001; Sammarra and 
Biggiero, 2008), the competitive and regulatory setting (Van den Bosch et al., 1999), and inter-
firm arrangements (e.g., Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Mason and Leek, 2008; Rothaermel and 
Alexandre, 2009). In recent years, AC is increasingly conceptualized as a dynamic capability 
(e.g., Lane et al., 2006; Zahra and George, 2002), meaning that scholars have moved from seeing 
firms as passive recipients of knowledge to recognizing their active role in interpreting external 
knowledge to fit their own strategies and structures (Lane et al., 2006; Nag and Gioia, 2012; 
Volberda et al., 2010). The focus is thus on firm-internal factors that produce heterogeneity in 
firms’ potential and realized AC (Jansen et al., 2006; Lane et al., 2006; Volberda et al., 2010). In 
this regard, scholars emphasize the pivotal role of managers and their cognitive processes (cf. 
Lane et al., 2006, p. 857). For example, Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) show that managers offset 
their limited knowledge of the environment by using cognitive representations deriving from 
historical experience to drive search processes in a new technological environment. Nag and 
Gioia (2012) observe that top managers’ existing knowledge and their beliefs on external 
knowledge not only shape their approaches to scan external knowledge, but also the subsequent 
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Research on AC has largely been developed in the context of widely held, professionally-
managed firms, thereby disregarding the important influence of owners, and, implicitly, assumes 
that the decisions and processes involved in the use of external knowledge are influenced by 
organizational members at various levels, yet not by owners. Indeed, owners are often treated as 
rather “inactive” group without much influence on firm level activities and capabilities. For 
instance, the rather comprehensive literature reviews on AC by Lane et al. (2006) and Volberda 
et al. (2010) do not include any reference to potentially influencing owners. This assumption is 
problematic as firm owners can influence key strategic decisions in many ways such as 
shareholder activism and direct involvement in management (Connelly et al., 2010; David et al., 
2001; Hoskisson et al., 2002). This lack of integration is especially an issue when considering 
that family ownership, predominant in most countries and industries (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999), 
can be associated with strong affective and social ties between family owners and the firm, 
ultimately implying that socio-emotional considerations play a prominent role in decision-making 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). This calls into question the overly rational view of AC developed in 
prior research (Lane et al., 2006; Volberda et al., 2010), suggesting that only limited 
understanding of AC is achieved when not explicitly taking into account the role of family 
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The role of family ownership 
Family owners are defined as individuals, related by blood and marriage, that possess, on the one 
hand, sufficient ownership shares to influence the firm’s decision making and, on the other hand, 
the willingness to do so now and across generations (Carney, 2005; Chua et al., 1999; De Massis 
et al., 2014).
2
 The amount of shares necessary for such ability and willingness to exert influence 
depends, among others, on the institutional setting as well as the legal form of the firm, ranging 
from absolute majority of equity shares in private firms to relative majority in publicly traded 
ones.  
Although no studies directly examine the influence of family ownership on AC, research 
in related areas indicates the importance and potential complexity of this relation. As Table 1 
shows, prior studies examine a number of aspects related to family ownership that, albeit 
indirectly, have implications for AC. For example, there is considerable interest in the influence 
of family ownership on R&D investments (e.g., Block, 2012; Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2013; Patel and Chrisman, 2014; Sirmon et al., 2008), typically seen as a proxy of a 
firm’s stock of prior knowledge and often associated with AC (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane 
et al., 2001). R&D investments are however only a weak predictor of AC (Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998; Tortoriello, 2015; Volberda et al., 2010) and such emphasis overshadows other important 
aspects of the processes through which firms acquire and exploit external knowledge. Research 
on technology acquisitions (Kotlar et al., 2013) indicates important consequences of family 
ownership on potential AC. Relatedly, research examining knowledge internalization within the 
family (Chirico and Salvato, 2014) and knowledge recombination in the family firm (Patel and 
Fiet, 2011) offers further insights into the knowledge structures of family firms, which are critical 
                                                            
2 This definition excludes lone founders, i.e. circumstances where no relatives of a founder are involved in the 
business neither as owners nor as managers, consistent with prior literature showing that ownership by lone 
founders exercises substantially different effects from family ownership, i.e. when instead multiple family 
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to their ability to acquire and assimilate external knowledge (Volberda et al., 2010). Some 
authors provide insights on the influence of family ownership on realized AC such as Block 
(2012) and Duran et al. (2016) who focus on the ability to turn innovation input into output and 
Patel and Chrisman (2014) who examine explorative and exploitative R&D investments.  
 
Collectively, the research summarized in Table 1 suggests that family ownership is likely to 
be an important antecedent of a firm’s AC. However, most prior studies do not differentiate the 
effects of family ownership on knowledge acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and 
exploitation. Moreover, the few articles that hold implications for both potential and realized AC 
tend to emphasize either the positive or the negative effects of family ownership (e.g., Patel and 
Chrisman, 2014), but no theoretical framework explains how simultaneous positive and negative 
effects may operate through different mechanisms. Finally, prior studies tend to consider family 
ownership as homogeneous, thereby overlooking the variety of forms it can take (Chua et al., 
2012). Recent research identifies some contingency factors such as life cycle stages (Sharma and 
Salvato, 2011) and situational variables such as performance feedback (Chrisman and Patel, 
2012; Kotlar et al., 2013; Patel and Chrisman, 2014), pressure from institutional investors 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2013), imitability threats (Sirmon et al., 2008), and the escalating 
bargaining power of suppliers (Kotlar et al., 2014). However, knowledge of how the influence of 
family owners varies across populations of firms is nascent at best (e.g., Chua et al., 2012). For 
these reasons, it is not possible to extrapolate from existing research to form an overarching 
framework that explains the mechanisms through which family owners influence AC and the 
conditions under which family ownership is beneficial or detrimental to the firm’s potential and 
realized AC. To address this issue, we develop a model of the influence of family owners on firm 
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RECONCEPTUALIZING THE INFLUENCE OF FAMILY OWNERS 
Conceptualizations of family ownership and organizational consequences vary across theoretical 
frameworks and empirical studies, ranging from broad concepts, such as socio-emotional wealth 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007) and familiness (Habbershon et al., 2003), to more granular 
conceptualizations deconstructing the influence of family owners into its multiple components 
(e.g., the “Four Cs” model, Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005; the “Three Ps”, Carney, 2005). 
Table 2 summarizes previous attempts to define the influence of family owners, showing that 
they converge to some extent but also differ in many ways, as each tends to rely on a different 
theoretical perspective and emphasize different elements. Most noticeably, all definitions tend to 
treat the different components of family influence as reflective and covariant, thereby implicitly 
assuming that, as the level family ownership increases, also family owners’ emotional attachment 
and power concentration will increase. Yet, even if the degree of family ownership is constant, 
how family members use their influence to shape firm behavior can vary significantly (Chrisman 
et al., 2012; 2015b). Therefore, a single, linear construct of family influence is limited to fully 
understand and explain the heterogeneous influence of family ownership on firm behavior. 
As Table 2 shows, when the various factors considered in each definition are disentangled 
and considered separately, they tend to converge around two major dimensions. First, a number 
of factors associated with family ownership appear to relate to emotional aspects, such as 
“Family’s values and goals”, “Image association between family and business”, “Family culture” 
and “Family-firm identification”. Second, another set of factors common to all the 
conceptualizations of family owner influence relates to power and decision-control aspects, such 
as “Family control of the dominant coalition”, “Authority and autonomy of family owners”, 
“Family members involved in strategic decisions” and “Unification of ownership and 
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converges toward two main constructs, emotional attachment and power concentration, that 
respectively qualify the role of family owners in governing the firm, as illustrated in Table 2. 
 
This classification provides a more granular and consistent theoretical base to examine the 
heterogeneity of family owner influence. In particular, we propose that the influence of family 
owners on the AC of their firm will vary depending on the strength of their emotional attachment 
to the firm and the degree of power concentration in the family, which can, but do not have to, 
correlate with the specific amount of ownership that the family possesses. While emotional 
attachment and power concentration might be, in parts, mutually reinforcing, these dimensions 
highlight different aspects of family influence that can vary independently from one another, at 
least in the short and mid term. Thus, elaborating on these two dimensions separately facilitates 
theorizing about their distinct effects. This allows avoiding the weaknesses of umbrella constructs 
and artificial dichotomies between family and non-family firms (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 
2014). It also allows broadening the applicability of our theoretical framework to other classes of 
owners with different configurations of emotional attachment and power concentration.  
 
Emotional attachment 
We define emotional attachment as the strength of social and affective ties between the group of 
family owners and the firm. Thus, emotional attachment is a construct that refers to the group of 
family owners in the firm, and is therefore a firm-internal factor that qualifies the nature of the 
relationship between firm owners and the business. Although family business literature portrays 
family firms as a particularly emotion-dense organizational setting (Kellermanns and Eddleston, 
2004; Zellweger and Dehlen, 2012), we posit that emotional attachment is a continuous 
dimension ranging from weak to strong along which all (family-owned) firms can be arrayed. 
Research on emotions in organizations shows that the emotional considerations of decision-
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well as strategic goals and firm behaviors (e.g., Huy, 2012). The stronger the emotional 
attachment of family owners to the firm, the more they consider that their emotional value is at 
stake when making strategic decisions (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; 
Kotlar et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2013; Patel and Chrisman, 2014). This produces a mix of 
rational and emotional considerations when formulating strategic goals (Kotlar and De Massis, 
2013). Therefore, variations in emotional attachment will correspond to different strategic goals. 
As shown in Table 2, emotional attachment encompasses a number of elements that recur in prior 
conceptualizations of family influence, which together capture the current and intended relations 
between family owners and the firm.  
 
Power concentration 
Power concentration is defined as the degree to which discretion in decision-making – and, thus 
the rights to decide or act according to one's own judgment (e.g., Hambrick and Finkelstein, 
1987)—is concentrated in the hands of family owners. We suggest that power concentration is 
also a continuous dimension ranging from low to high along which all firms can be arrayed. 
Similar to emotional attachment, power concentration is a firm-internal factor that refers to the 
group of family owners in the firm, and further contributes to qualifying the nature of the 
relationship between firm owners and the business. When power is more concentrated in the 
hands of family owners, knowledge, information, and ideas tend to be generated at the top and 
cascade down the organization (Carney, 2005; Ibarra, 1992; Mintzberg, 1980). As such, family 
owners can initiate major strategic changes without extensive bargaining with other 
organizational constituencies. However, power concentration also implies a higher power 
distance between family and non-family members, potentially lowering the weight given to the 
perspectives and ideas of non-family employees (Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2004; Patel and 
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different formal hierarchical structures and informal social relations. Table 2 illustrates that power 
concentration incorporates recurring factors in existing conceptualizations of family influence, 
which relate to the configurations of firm ownership and management. 
 
MECHANISMS LINKING FAMILY OWNERSHIP TO AC 
Drawing on prior literature, we have distilled two dimensions, emotional attachment and power 
concentration, that qualify the type of family owner influence and position the different forms 
that it can take within a multi-faceted continuum in relation to shaping the firm. We use these two 
dimensions to build a theoretical framework explaining the mechanisms that link family 
ownership to AC. There is currently no theory of the effects of family ownership on AC, which 
constitutes a major knowledge gap. Based on corporate governance, cognitive psychology, and 
AC research, we elaborate on the model of family owner influence illustrated in the previous 
section to examine the specific mechanisms through which family ownership can influence 
potential and realized AC. This analysis allows considering the contingency factors that 
contribute to determining the ultimate effect of family ownership on AC. 
 
Emotional attachment and AC 
AC is commonly seen as cumulative and path-dependent as existing knowledge defines the locus 
of search for new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002). Firms need 
to search broadly for diverse and complementary sources of external knowledge to benefit from 
recombination effects (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). Therefore, the firm’s willingness to move 
away from current organizational routines and knowledge bases is essential to potential AC 
(Katila and Ahuja, 2002). In this regard, the cognitive processes underlying decisions on external 
knowledge acquisition can be crucial. Cognitive psychology literature suggests that ownership 
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part of their self-domain while those they cannot control fall into the non-self domain (Dittmar, 
1992; Pierce et al., 2001). Individuals tend to attach symbolic valence to their possessions that 
increases their worth beyond their economic value (e.g., Belk, 1988; Ciarrochi and Forgas, 2000). 
Hence, the stronger the family owners’ emotional attachment to the firm, the more they are likely 
to value the firm’s existing knowledge assets, to attribute lower value to external knowledge that 
is distant from their existing knowledge bases (König et al., 2013), and consequently avoid 
diverging from the firm’s current stock of knowledge.  
It follows that as emotional attachment strengthens, family owners will become increasingly 
committed to current knowledge assets (Pierce et al., 2001) and less willing to consider diverse 
sources of external knowledge. Existing knowledge has plausibly contributed to the firm’s 
success and the acquisition of new external knowledge could thus be seen as “painful” (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986), requiring a substantial reconfiguration of existing knowledge and divesting 
assets that formerly constituted the firm’s core. For these reasons, emotional attachment can 
expose family owners to psychological preconceptions against external knowledge, generating 
cognitive traps (Miller, 1991) and organizational pathologies such as inertia (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984) and the not-invented-here syndrome (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
Moreover, strong emotional attachment leads owners to see the preservation of their 
emotional value as a primary reference in strategic decisions (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; 
Zellweger et al., 2012) and thus to avoid the potential loss of control ensuing from the acquisition 
of new external knowledge. The benefits of external knowledge acquisition and assimilation are 
uncertain since managers are required to make decisions on aspects over which they have less 
control than within the boundaries of their firm (Kotlar et al., 2013). Relatedly, by acquiring and 
assimilating external knowledge, the firm’s innovation activities become increasingly dependent 
on the competencies and expertise of external actors. In the future, these actors could take 
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emotional attachment is strong, family owners are likely to see the uncertainty related to external 
knowledge acquisition and assimilation as a threat to maintaining their socio-emotional 
endowment (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Kotlar et al., 2013). This argument is in line with 
previous empirical evidence suggesting that family firms due to their emphasis on preserving 
emotional connections with the business tend to acquire less external technology compared to 
non-family firms (Kotlar et al., 2013) and that such emphasis leads to lower willingness to 
engage in technological collaborations with external partners (e.g., Nieto et al., 2015, Pittino and 
Visintin, 2011). Taken together, these arguments suggest that family owner emotional attachment 
to the firm could decrease potential AC.  
Proposition 1a (P1a): Family ownership influences the firm’s AC through emotional attachment, 
such that increasing emotional attachment of family owners decreases the level of potential AC. 
 
A different picture emerges when considering how the strength of family owner emotional 
attachment influences realized AC. Realized AC is directed towards integrating newly acquired 
knowledge into existing knowledge bases to expand current products and services and increase 
the efficiency of existing processes (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002). 
Uncertainty on the scope and complexity of external knowledge arguably lessens once it is 
acquired, combined with the firm’s existing knowledge, and integrated into the family owners’ 
cognitive frames (Benner and Tushman, 2002; Jansen et al., 2006; Nag and Gioia, 2012; Tripsas 
and Gavetti, 2000). It is thus likely that reluctance towards external knowledge will lessen once it 
has been assimilated. Family owner emotional attachment could thus be a strong incentive to 
transform and apply new knowledge once assimilated to reinforce existing products, services, and 
processes (Benner and Tushman, 2002; Levinthal and March, 1993; Lewin et al., 2011). 
Clearly, any owners who have invested a significant portion of their personal wealth will 
have a strong incentive to ensure the financial resources allocated to acquiring new technologies 
are harvested efficiently and that new knowledge is used intensively (Carney, 2005). In addition, 
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invested effort and time in such knowledge, which increases their psychological attachment to it 
(Pierce et al., 2001). Once new external knowledge is available within the firm, owners will tend 
to incorporate this knowledge into their self-domain (e.g., Ciarrochi and Forgas, 2000). Hence, 
the family owners’ personal feelings, name, and reputation are at stake and they are likely to 
commit to ensuring such knowledge is effectively incorporated to improve products and 
production processes. Moreover, the investment and resource mobilizations required to transform 
and exploit newly available knowledge are lower compared to the first phase (Zahra and George, 
2002), which implies lower uncertainty and more predictable outcomes (Cardinal, 2001; Jansen 
et al., 2006). Accordingly, emotional attachment is likely to lead family owners to perceive 
transformation and exploitation efforts towards newly available technology as a viable strategy to 
nurture their emotional endowment by means of continued investments in the firm’s knowledge 
base. Using newly acquired and assimilated knowledge to strengthen the firm’s core business 
through investing in knowledge exploitation is thus seen as consistent with preserving the 
emotional value of owners. Such knowledge exploitation could also reduce performance 
variability and increase the family owners’ reputation due to their historic links with these 
business activities (Patel and Chrisman, 2014). These arguments suggest that family owner 
emotional attachment will influence potential and realized AC in opposite directions. 
Proposition 1b (P1b): Family ownership influences the firm’s AC through emotional attachment, 
such that increasing emotional attachment of family owners increases the level of realized AC.  
 
Power concentration and AC 
To acquire external knowledge, firms need to scan their environment, particularly sources that 
provide complimentary and distinct knowledge but are also related to prior knowledge (Zahra and 
George, 2002). Potential AC depends not only on the willingness but also on the ability to deviate 
from existing routines and knowledge to expand the type and scope of input into the knowledge 
funnel. In this respect, prior research argues that the firm’s authority structures can constrain or 
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decision makers (Cardinal, 2001; Lane et al., 2006). In particular, as organizational authority is 
concentrated in family owners, they are subject to fewer internal and external constraints and can 
thus easily pursue the acquisition of new external knowledge, resulting in increased potential AC. 
Concentration of power in the hands of family owners provides them with particularly strong 
bargaining power (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987), meaning that family owners, if keen on 
acquiring and assimilating external knowledge, are exempt from the internal bureaucratic 
constraints that limit decision-makers in firms where power is more diluted (Carney, 2005). 
Consequently, power concentration in the hands of family owners can reduce the time and 
procedures that commonly delay inflows of knowledge and increase the speed and intensity of 
efforts to identify and gather new knowledge, thereby facilitating the firm’s potential AC (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990; Todorova and Durisin, 2007; Zahra and George, 2002).  
Furthermore, as power is concentrated in the hands of family owners, they can act with 
greater variability in their choices (Carney, 2005), which enables considering alternative 
information and knowledge. Concentrated power releases family owners from the instrumental 
rationality that typically ensues from formal procedures, checks, and balances and allows making 
decisions on acquiring and assimilating uncertain assets (e.g., Jansen et al., 2006). As power 
concentration relaxes procedural rigor, family owners’ decisions become conceivably less 
predictable and more capricious, and enable pursuing a greater variety of sources of external 
knowledge. Relatedly, when power is highly concentrated in the hands of family owners, it is 
reasonable to expect lower reliance on formalized management practices as these would inhibit 
the family owners’ freedom (Carney, 2005). Formalization refers to “the degree to which a 
codified body of rules, procedures or behavior prescriptions is developed to handle decisions” 
(Pierce and Delbecq, 1977, p. 31). Thus, formalization is a form of control of the individual 
behaviors of managers and objectifies decision-making. Scholars have long recognized that 
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assimilation (e.g., Jansen et al., 2006; Shepard, 1967). Moreover, empirical evidence indicates 
that formalization has a negative effect on the potential AC of teams (Jansen et al., 2005). As 
power becomes more concentrated, family owners are likely to relax formalization so that the 
efforts of key decision makers can be directed towards expanded aspects of the external 
environment, producing greater knowledge acquisition intensity and scope. Accordingly, power 
concentration in family owners enables the firm to build up potential AC.   
Proposition 2a (P2a): Family ownership influences the firm’s AC through power concentration, 
such that increasing power concentration increases the level of potential AC. 
 
However, power concentration in family owners may be detrimental when it comes to 
transforming and exploiting newly acquired knowledge, suggesting an opposing effect of power 
concentration on the firm’s realized AC. Realized AC reflects the firm’s ability to transform and 
exploit external knowledge once acquired to create valuable outcomes, and is particularly driven 
by the support of members at lower levels of the organizational pyramid (Lenox and King, 2004; 
Zahra and George, 2002). Indeed, middle managers and employees are knowledge carriers of 
daily routines (Ibarra, 1992) and are critical to exchanging knowledge across disciplinary and 
hierarchical boundaries (Jansen et al., 2005; Teece et al., 1997). Higher power concentration 
gives family owners the discretion to act with greater variability in their choices, but can also 
cause authority to prevail over individual skills and experience in determining involvement in 
decisions on which knowledge to transform and apply within the organization and which to 
discard. Authority structures have important implications on how the attention and motivation of 
organizational members are directed towards innovation activities (Cardinal, 2001). For example, 
Verbeke and Kano (2012) argue that the concentration of power in the hands of firm owners 
causes a “bifurcation bias” or mounting discrepancy between family owners and other managers 
and employees. The latter are considered outsiders and treated asymmetrically, typically 
disregarding their contributions and excluding them from obtaining rewards based on 
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involvement of outsiders in decision-making. It follows that the weight given to the views and 
ideas of non-family managers and employees will diminish as power concentrates in family 
owners (Patel and Cooper, 2014), which can disrupt collective learning processes (Bunderson and 
Reagans, 2011; Lenox and King, 2004) and decrease the level of knowledge exchange 
(Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2004). High power concentration is likely to increase the 
perceptions of disparity in status and compensation between family and non-family members, 
leaving non-family managers and employees with little incentive to contribute to the firm’s 
efforts to transform and exploit newly available knowledge (Harrison and Klein, 2007). When 
power is highly concentrated in family owners, organizational members in the middle and lower 
ranks have little opportunity to have a say on what and how knowledge is used (Carney, 2005; 
Geeraerts, 1984). If decision-making on external knowledge is dominated by family owners, the 
commitment of non-family members to the strategic decisions is likely to diminish (Patel and 
Cooper, 2014). Therefore, lower level managers and employees will be less incentivized to put 
their efforts and creativity into translating and applying the new knowledge to improve current 
processes and products (Verbeke and Kano, 2012), which is likely to jeopardize the firm’s 
capacity to process external knowledge (Lenox and King, 2004).  
Thus, while power concentration in family owners is likely to relax the constraints to build up 
potential AC as argued above, it reduces knowledge exchange across the organization, eventually 
obstructing the transformation and implementation of newly acquired knowledge. 
Proposition 2b (P2b): Family ownership influences the firm’s AC through power concentration, 
such that increasing power concentration decreases the level of realized AC. 
 
 
The paradoxical effects of family ownership on AC 
Our analysis has identified two key mechanisms through which family ownership can facilitate 
and hamper AC as summarized in Figure 1. Specifically, we argue that family ownership hinders 
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owners’ emotional attachment to the firm strengthens (Proposition 1). Conversely, family 
ownership has a positive effect on potential AC and a negative effect on realized AC as power is 
concentrated in family owners (Proposition 2). As such, our analysis suggests that the influence 
exerted by family ownership on AC through emotional attachment and power concentration is 
misaligned and therefore has decisive implications on the ultimate effect of family ownership on 
the firm’s potential and realized AC. Ultimately, these effects hold important implications for 
organizational outcomes such as innovation, competitive advantage, and firm performance 
(Volberda et al., 2010). 
 
Motivation gap. With respect to potential AC, power concentration endows family owners with 
greater discretion and latitude of action (Carney, 2005). Thus, power concentration in family 
owners increases the firm’s ability to search broadly, without the need to observe bureaucratic or 
administrative constraints. Nevertheless, the emotional attachment of family owners leads these 
decision-makers to undervalue external knowledge (König et al., 2013; Kotlar et al., 2013) and 
hence reduces the firm’s willingness to acquire and assimilate knowledge outside existing 
domains. In other words, the combination of the positive effects associated with power 
concentration and the negative effects associated with emotional attachment suggests that family 
ownership affects potential AC in both upward and downward directions, possibly resulting in 
extremely high and extremely low degrees of potential AC amongst family firms depending on 
the specific combination of emotional attachment and power concentration in the respective firm. 
We can thus reasonably expect to observe higher heterogeneity in potential AC across firms with 
higher degrees of family ownership. The dotted box in Figure 1 illustrates the possible effects of 
family ownership on potential AC, where the upper and lower limits respectively represent a 
firm’s willingness to acquire and assimilate external knowledge and its ability to do so. The 
actual level of potential AC, illustrated by the gray area in Figure 1, will become higher (lower) 
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consequences of family ownership on potential AC are thus complex to predict due to the 
inconsistency of the effects of emotional attachment and power concentration. The ultimate effect 
depends primarily on the motivation gap between the greater ability and lower willingness to 
acquire and assimilate external knowledge, and thus on contingencies that strengthen or weaken 
the effects of family owners’ emotional attachment. 
Definition 1: A motivation gap occurs when the firm’s higher ability to acquire and assimilate 
external knowledge is counterbalanced by its lower willingness to do so, and the size of the gap 
depends on contingencies that relate to the family owners’ emotional attachment. 
 
Implementation gap. With respect to realized AC, the reluctance towards external knowledge 
caused by family owner emotional attachment lessens and is replaced by incentives to transform 
and exploit the acquired knowledge resources for commercial ends (Carney, 2005; Duran et al., 
2016; Patel and Chrisman, 2014). Thus, emotional attachment increases the firm’s willingness to 
transform and exploit external knowledge once acquired. Yet, power concentration in family 
owners isolates them from the rest of the organization (Ibarra, 1992), which reduces the incentive 
of lower-rank managers and employees to actually implement such new knowledge in existing 
processes and products (Lenox and King, 2004; Patel and Cooper, 2014). Thus, power 
concentration reduces the firm’s ability to transform and exploit newly acquired knowledge. For 
these reasons, as for potential AC, the simultaneous influence of emotional attachment and power 
concentration can reasonably increase the heterogeneity of realized AC among family-owned 
firms. The possible effects of family ownership on realized AC are illustrated in the dotted box in 
Figure 1. The actual level of realized AC (the gray area in the figure) will become higher (lower) 
as the implementation gap between ability and willingness to transform and exploit external 
knowledge becomes smaller (larger). Therefore, our examination suggests that the ultimate effect 
of family ownership on realized AC varies according to the size of the implementation gap 
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knowledge and thus depends on contingencies that increase or decrease the influence of family 
owners on firm structure through power concentration. 
Definition 2: An implementation gap occurs when the firm’s higher willingness to transform and 
exploit external knowledge is counterbalanced by the firm’s lower ability to do so, and the size of 
the gap depends primarily on contingencies that relate to family owners’ power concentration. 
 
The motivation and the implementation gaps highlighted in our analysis show two paradoxical 
effects of family ownership on potential and realized AC. Our analysis suggests that family 
ownership can enhance the capability to acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit external 
knowledge but only under certain conditions. In an attempt to identify the conditions under which 
firms reduce the misalignment between ability and willingness to acquire, assimilate, transform, 
and exploit external knowledge, in the following section we discuss how contingency factors 
relating to family owner emotional attachment and power concentration, and the latent and time-
varying nature of these influences, affect the identified gaps. Accordingly, we advance a 
contingency-based and temporal model that helps predict whether family ownership will facilitate 
or impede the development of AC. 
 
CONTINGENCIES DETERMINING FAMILY OWNERSHIP EFFECTS ON AC 
 
Prior research shows the high heterogeneity of AC across firms (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; 
Jansen et al., 2005; Lane et al., 2001; Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008). Identifying the drivers of 
such heterogeneity has recently attracted considerable research interest (Lane et al., 2006; 
Todorova and Durisin, 2007; Volberda et al., 2010). Our analysis suggests that family ownership 
is an important internal driver of AC heterogeneity but such influence can be both positive and 
negative. By outlining the two key mechanisms through which family ownership influences 
potential and realized AC, namely, emotional attachment and power concentration, our 
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specific mechanisms outlined above, can cause positive or negative family ownership effects to 
prevail. 
 
Contingencies of family influence relating to emotional attachment 
According to our analysis, family ownership can produce a misalignment between the firm’s 
ability to build up potential AC and its willingness to do so, the motivation gap, which increases 
or decreases the firm’s potential AC depending on the relative strength of family owner influence 
through emotional attachment. Accordingly, we identify contingency factors that determine the 
effect of family ownership on potential AC. In particular, we first investigate the factors that 
increase the motivation gap and then discuss the factors that decrease this gap.   
Two specific contingency factors emerge from research that could operate through family 
owner emotional attachment to the firm, namely, family-firm identification (Deephouse and 
Jaskiewicz, 2013) and family control intentions (Chua et al., 1999; Zellweger et al., 2012). 
Literature suggests that when family owners identify with the firm and see it as “our business” 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Kammerlander, 2016) or include their name in the firm’s name 
(Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013; De Massis et al., 2018), they tend to perceive the firm’s 
wealth as an extension of their family’s wellbeing (e.g., Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005). 
Moreover, they perceive a higher sense of belonging that leads them to feel emotionally invested 
in the firm (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013; Zellweger et al., 2012). Therefore, family-firm 
identification is likely to increase the importance of emotional attachment in family owner 
decisions on the use of external knowledge and thus increase the motivation gap.  
The second factor is family control intentions, defined as the family owners’ vision for the 
firm to be transmitted to the next generation (Chua et al., 1999; Zellweger et al., 2012). Some 
studies suggest that family control is the primary concern of family owners and that such 
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events such as the birth of new family members or the desire of a younger generation member to 
join the business (Chua et al., 2004). For these reasons, the intentions for continued family 
control play a central role in emerging theories of the family firm and are considered a primary 
driver of family firm heterogeneity (Chrisman et al., 2012; Chua et al., 1999). The intention for 
family control leads family owners to consider the future benefits of control as part of their 
current emotional endowment, which increases the emotional value family owners attribute to the 
firm beyond its economic value (Zellweger et al., 2012). It follows that the intention for family 
control increases the salience of family-centered goals in decision making (Chrisman et al., 2012) 
and strengthens the importance of family owner emotional considerations in decisions on external 
knowledge acquisition. Combining these arguments with our proposition that family owner 
emotional attachment reduces the willingness to acquire and assimilate external knowledge and 
causes a motivation gap that inhibits potential AC leads to predicting that the motivation gap are 
likely to be stronger when family owners form explicit intentions for continued family control.  
Proposition 3 (P3): Ceteris paribus, the motivation gap becomes larger and the negative effect of 
family ownership on potential AC prevails when (a) family owners strongly identify with the firm 
or (b) family owners have strong family control intentions. 
 
Research also indicates two key factors that may reduce the influence of family ownership 
through emotional attachment: first, threats that undermine economic performance (Chrisman 
and Patel, 2012; Patel and Chrisman, 2014) and, second, factors that endanger the family owner’s 
future control of the firm (Kotlar et al., 2013, 2014; Sirmon et al., 2008). Studies adopting a 
behavioral theory perspective show that negative performance feedbacks trigger preference 
reversals that lead to actions that are diametrically opposed to those observed in more favorable 
situations (e.g., Chrisman and Patel, 2012). For example, research on R&D investments shows 
that, faced with negative performance feedbacks, family firms invest more in R&D than non-
family firms (Chrisman and Patel, 2012) and change their emphasis from exploitative to 
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wake of threats that could reduce the family owner’s freedom and authority in the future, such as 
when supplier bargaining power increases (Kotlar et al., 2014) or when competitors imitate the 
firm’s resources and processes (Sirmon et al., 2008). In these situations, the firm’s survival and 
continuity are put at risk and a rational logic is likely to take precedence over emotional concerns, 
leading to higher potential AC.  
Proposition 4 (P4): Ceteris paribus, the motivation gap becomes smaller and the positive effect of 
family ownership on potential AC prevails when (a) the firm faces negative performance 
feedbacks or (b) the firm faces control threats. 
 
Contingencies of family influence relating to power concentration 
The second mechanism that links family ownership to the level of AC is the concentration of 
power in family owners, which we argue is the primary cause of the implementation gap that 
makes a firm less able to transform and exploit newly acquired knowledge despite its willingness 
to do so. Accordingly, the contingency factors that determine the ultimate effect of family 
ownership on realized AC relate to the power concentration dimension of family influence.  
Our model implies that the degree of power concentration can change according to ownership 
and management configuration. We draw on prior studies on corporate governance in family 
firms to identify factors that strengthen the relationship between family ownership and AC 
through power concentration: the presence of a family CEO (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001) and 
family involvement in other top managerial positions (Cannella et al., 2014). A considerable 
body of research shows that the family owners’ span of control increases when the ultimate 
control of the firm is restricted to a close circle of family owners and affiliates (Carney, 2005; 
Patel and Cooper, 2014). Moreover, prior empirical studies suggest that power concentration is 
amplified when family owners appoint the CEO and other top executives based on personal 
relationships, thereby forming relational rather than arm’s length agreements (Cannella et al., 
2014; Cruz et al., 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001) and gaining substantial  decision-making 











This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
concentration to become stronger with the increasing managerial involvement of family 
members, leading to lower realized AC.  
Proposition 5 (P5): Ceteris paribus, the implementation gap becomes larger and the negative 
effect of family ownership on realized AC prevails in the presence of (a) a family CEO or (b) 
family members involved in top management. 
 
Two factors emerge from studies on corporate governance in family firms that can weaken 
the influence of family ownership through power concentration: the dispersion of family 
ownership among multiple family members (De Massis et al., 2013b; Schulze et al., 2003) and 
institutional ownership investments (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2013). When family ownership is 
divided among multiple members, the principal family owners tend to lose authority and 
influence over other family shareholders and struggle to obtain their support to pursue their 
preferences (Schulze et al., 2003), especially in light of the diversity of goals and values pursued 
by other family members (Kotlar and De Massis, 2013). Therefore, family ownership dispersion 
is likely to reduce power inequality and bifurcation biases in the firm (Patel and Cooper, 2014; 
Verbeke and Kano, 2012). Family owners are likely to allow higher representation of non-family 
managers and employees in strategy formulation processes, thereby increasing their motivation to 
contribute to transforming and exploiting new knowledge and reducing the implementation gap. 
The second factor that can operate as a contingency factor is the presence of institutional 
ownership investments. Recent research has shown the increasing activism of institutional 
investors who tend to open up the firm’s governance structures based on their ownership stake 
(e.g., Connelly et al., 2010; Hoskisson et al., 2002). Some research suggests that institutional 
investors tend to safeguard their economic interests by appointing independent directors and 
increasing the level of governance mechanisms aimed at reducing family owner discretion 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2013). Therefore, we expect the presence of institutional investors to 
weaken the influence of family ownership on external knowledge transformation and exploitation 











This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
Proposition 6 (P6): Ceteris paribus, the implementation gap becomes smaller and the positive 
effect of family ownership on realized AC prevails in the presence of (a) high family ownership 
dispersion or (b) institutional investments. 
 
TEMPORAL VARIATIONS OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP EFFECTS ON AC 
Literature often emphasizes the importance of considering temporal aspects in studying AC (e.g., 
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2006; Volberda et al., 2010). Furthermore, many 
scholars emphasize the life-cycle of family ownership and its organizational consequences (e.g., 
Gersick et al., 1997; Kotlar and De Massis, 2013; Schulze et al., 2003; Zellweger et al., 2012). 
Therefore, a temporal perspective is critical to shedding further light on the diversity of forms that 
family influence can take and the ensuing variations of AC over time. Our analysis particularly 
focuses on two core factors that we argue determine the development of family owner emotional 
attachment and power concentration: duration of family ownership and family ownership 
succession. 
 
Duration of family ownership and AC 
Cognitive psychology suggests that the influence of family ownership on potential AC through 
emotional attachment, primarily stemming from the family owners’ tendency to value external 
knowledge less than the knowledge that already exists, can vary with the duration of family 
ownership. The duration of family ownership refers to the length of time that family owners have 
been in control of the firm (Zellweger et al., 2012). As noted above, emotional attachment to 
possessions generally follows a psychological appropriation process, namely, over time the 
owner increasingly perceives an asset as “mine” and its possession gradually becomes part of the 
owner’s identity (Belk, 1988). This process unfolds with repeated rituals through which owners 
interact with the assets and attribute them personal meaning (Belk, 1988). Over time, family 
owners become intimately familiar with their firm’s knowledge and recurrently invest in 
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attachment to existing knowledge assets (Pierce et al., 2001). For example, research on 
organizational tenure suggests that the length of association between an individual or a group of 
individuals—whether it is an owner, a manager, or an employee—and the organization is directly 
related to work experience and job-related knowledge, which in turn are likely to increase path-
dependency and to decrease risk-taking and experimentation (see Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1990; Ng and Feldman, 2010).  
Extending these arguments to family owners, as the duration of family ownership increases, 
prior knowledge is likely to become part of the family owners’ legacy and symbolize their 
continuity, increasing the later generation’s perceived value of the assets beyond their financial 
value (Zellweger et al., 2012). Likewise, we expect family owners to increase their psychological 
attachment to existing knowledge assets with time. These arguments, juxtaposed with those used 
to develop Proposition 1, suggest that the emotional attachment of family owners should increase 
over time, thereby increasing the perceived value of existing knowledge versus external 
knowledge. This, in turn, is likely to decrease willingness to acquire and assimilate new external 
technology, but increase willingness to transform and exploit previously acquired knowledge.   
At the same, the influence of family ownership through power concentration is likely to 
weaken over time. Through repeated interactions with the organization’s processes and products, 
family owners will build trust toward non-family managers and employees (Pierce et al., 2001). 
The longer association between the owner and non-family members, in turn, is likely to foster the 
family’s willingness to rely on the contribution of these members, supporting their participation 
in decision-making processes (Patel and Cooper, 2014) and reducing the distance between the 
upper echelon, owners and their associates, and the rest of the organization (Verbeke and Kano, 
2012). This reduction of power concentration is likely to diminish the positive effect of family 
ownership on potential AC, while also mitigating the negative effect of family ownership on 
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Based on this joint temporal evolution of the influence of emotional attachment and power of 
family owners on AC, we propose: 
Proposition 7 (P7): Duration of family ownership increases the motivation gap and reduces the 
implementation gap, such that potential AC deteriorates and realized AC improves with the 
duration of family ownership. 
 
Family ownership succession and AC 
As the emotional attachment of family owners increases and power concentration decreases with 
the duration of family ownership, we suggest that over time family ownership will increasingly 
become an impediment to potential AC, while progressively reinforcing realized AC. However, it 
is also plausible to expect that this trend can be disrupted, at least provisionally, when an 
ownership succession occurs.  
First, incoming family owners are likely to have a shorter history of interaction with the 
firm than their predecessors, and are thus less emotionally attached to the existing knowledge 
bases (e.g., Belk, 1988; Pierce et al., 2001). Such a temporary reduction of family owners’ 
emotional attachment is likely to have implications for both potential and realized AC. Indeed, 
this situation is likely to relax the cognitive biases that would otherwise lead family owners to see 
external knowledge as “not invented here”, and to free the firm from the ensuing inertia or path-
dependency when it comes to acquiring external knowledge. At the same time, a temporary 
reduction of emotional attachment may reduce family owners’ potential over-commitment to 
exploiting previously acquired external knowledge, compared to the preceding family owners 
who have acquired the knowledge in the first place. In sum, both positive and negative effects of 
family ownership through emotional attachment are likely to become temporarily weaker.  
The power structures of the firm are also likely to be disrupted, at least temporarily, when an 
ownership succession occurs. Incoming successors are likely to undertake a review of the existing 
organization, and possibly change the decision making processes in order to shape the firm 
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set up new business divisions, incite managerial turnover, and exclude other family owners from 
decision making to ensure they can freely imprint their vision on the firm. Thus, when an 
ownership succession occurs, the power concentration of incoming family owners is likely to 
become temporarily stronger, and decision making processes more centralized around the 
incoming family owner. This, in turn, is likely to strengthen both the positive effects of family 
ownership on potential AC (though power concentration) as well as the negative effects of family 
ownership on realized AC.  
Taken together, these arguments suggest that the effect of family ownership through power 
concentration is likely to prevail over the effect through emotional attachment during transitions 
of family ownership. Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 8 (P8): Family ownership succession reduces the motivation gap and increases the 
implementation gap, such that potential AC improves and realized AC deteriorates when an 
ownership succession occurs. 
 
DISCUSSION 
By integrating and extending prior research on AC and innovation in family firms, our primary 
purpose is to introduce family ownership as an important element to advance understanding of 
why firms operating under similar external conditions differ in their abilities to acquire, 
assimilate, transform, and exploit external knowledge. In this section, we summarize and discuss 
the theoretical contributions of this article and the implication of our work for future research and 
managerial practice. We also consider the reasons behind the contradictory theory and evidence 
on the influence of family ownership on firm innovation and discuss how our model helps 
reconcile this body of research. Finally, we discuss opportunities to test our model and extend its 
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Implications for AC theory 
This article contributes insights that extend the current understanding of AC by introducing firm 
ownership in the debate on its organizational antecedents. Scholars identify several factors that 
can affect AC, focusing particularly on managers (Volberda et al., 2010). By considering 
managers in isolation of firm ownership, scholars tend to focus on the development of AC in an 
impersonal setting and overlook the role of firm owners and the emotional considerations that can 
emerge when owners have strong social and emotional ties with the firm. Focusing on the 
consequences of firm ownership in terms of how firms manage external knowledge acquisition, 
assimilation, transformation, and exploitation, our analysis extends the current AC discussion 
beyond purely rational considerations to explain how emotional concerns affect the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying AC. As such, our analysis advances an emotion-based conceptualization 
of the cognitive processes involved in AC.  
Our analysis shows two key paradoxes, the motivation and implementation gaps, reflecting 
the tension between the firm’s willingness to develop AC and its ability to do so. The notion that 
AC requires both ability and willingness is implicit in prior conceptualization of the construct 
(e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2006). However, most research into the antecedents 
of AC is limited to an ability-based view that takes willingness for granted. The antecedents that 
influence a firm’s willingness to build AC are empirically less scrutinized than the firm’s ability 
to do so (Lane et al., 2006; Todorova and Durisin, 2007; Volberda et al., 2010), which constitutes 
a further research area.  
Disentangling the ability and willingness dimensions and encapsulating the underlying 
tension in the concept of motivation and implementation gaps, our analysis inspires a new 
approach to examining firm-level capabilities, particularly with regard to contingency factors and 
temporal dynamics. In the particular setting of family ownership, our analysis emphasizes that the 
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attachment and power concentration engenders inconsistent effects on AC such that family 
owners must balance their influence to achieve a fit between firm ability and willingness to 
develop AC. Rather than simply suggesting that some forms of firm ownership are more 
beneficial than others, our analysis suggests that the interplay between willingness and ability 
produces greater heterogeneity and variability in AC and therefore complicates the prediction of 
the ultimate effect of family ownership. To understand the sources of such heterogeneity, our 
analysis suggests that researchers should take a more nuanced and multifaceted perspective in 
identifying the multiple and potentially inconsistent mechanisms underlying capability 
development and seek creative ways that enable these effects to be mastered simultaneously. 
Applying these ideas beyond AC literature to advance understanding of the internal antecedents 
of other firm capabilities such as alliance capability, political management capability or 
entrepreneurial capability is a promising area for future research (Peteraf et al., 2013). 
 
Implications for innovation in family firms  
By examining the influence of family owners on AC, this article also addresses an important 
debate on innovation in family firms (De Massis et al., 2013a). Research has studied the 
influence of family ownership on a number of innovation aspects including R&D investments 
(e.g., Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2013; Sciascia et al., 2015), knowledge 
internalization (Chirico and Salvato, 2014), and discontinuous technology adoption 
(Kammerlander and Ganter, 2015; König et al., 2013). Although this body of research indicates 
that family ownership can be an important antecedent of innovation behaviors and outcomes, this 
literature is extremely fragmented and has yielded inconsistent conclusions and empirical results. 
By focusing on specific aspects of innovation, research has overlooked the possibility that family 
ownership can simultaneously exert positive and negative effects on innovation through different 
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Chrisman and Patel, 2012), yet little emphasis is placed on understanding such variations and the 
mechanisms that affect the organizational outcomes.  
Our theoretical analysis goes beyond previous approaches by advancing a systematic 
reconceptualization of family owner influence and reconciles the divergent views by 
differentiating the effect of family ownership on external knowledge exploration and exploitation. 
We distil two dimensions from literature, emotional attachment and power concentration, 
examining their individual effects on the development of potential and realized AC. Our focus on 
AC allows reconciling the divergent views by highlighting the contradictions between firm owner 
emotional attachment and power concentration in relation to external knowledge. In particular, 
we demonstrate that these contradictory dimensions produce motivation and implementation gaps 
that explain why family ownership can increase the heterogeneity and variability of AC. 
This analysis not only sheds light on the mechanisms underlying AC in family owned firms, 
but leads to understanding the importance of contingency factors and temporal aspects to predict 
the consequences of family ownership on innovation. More specifically, this analysis implies that 
variations in emotional attachment and power concentration may influence organizational 
adaptation over time, including AC. Our conceptual analysis responds to repeated calls in family 
business literature for greater understanding of the diversity of family ownership forms (e.g., 
Chrisman and Patel, 2012) and more dynamic perspectives on how firms acquire, assimilate, 
transform, and exploit external knowledge (e.g., Lane et al., 2006; Schildt et al., 2012; Van den 
Bosch et al., 1999). In particular, the analysis suggests that family ownership affects how AC 
develops over time; our arguments suggest that AC in firms with family ownership is 
characterized by relatively long periods of decreasing potential AC and increasing realized AC 
(as per P7), and potentially shorter periods of disruption in correspondence with family 
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temporal patterns, thereby illustrating the temporal perspective on the evolution of absorptive 
capacity in firms with family ownership that we outlined above.  
 
Thus, our theoretical analysis identifies family ownership as an important driver of variation 
in AC over time and offers a temporally contextualized view of differences in AC among family 
firms. This view challenges the traditional view of AC as path-dependent and cumulative (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2006; Volberda et al., 2010) and recalls organizational change 
as a process that is not linear but involves alternate periods of stability and shock-engendered 
periods of disruption (Huy and Mintzberg, 2003; Lewin, 1951).  
 
Implications for Practice 
Besides theoretical advancements, our model also brings along important insights for 
practitioners. Family firm owners, as well as CEOs working in family-owned firms, are 
increasingly concerned about the innovativeness of their firm, given that remaining innovative 
and adapting to changing environments becomes increasingly important in digitalized, globalized, 
and fast changing environments. As such, it is of utmost relevance for those practitioners to not 
only learn about whether family firms are, on average, more or less innovative, as often examined 
by prior, empirical research (e.g., Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Duran et al., 2016) but also to learn 
about the mechanisms that either foster their firms’ innovativeness or impede it. Our theoretical 
model aims to provide nuanced explanations about how two important implications of family 
ownership, that is the owners’ emotional attachment to the firm and their idiosyncratic power 
concentration, affects distinct dimensions of AC, namely potential and realized AC. Such 
framework allows family firm owners and managers to “map” their own firm’s situation onto the 
proposed framework and to understand their strength and weaknesses with regard to AC. For 
example, family firms can use the family/non-family status of the CEO and the level of family 
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power concentration. Similarly, by assessing the level of family-firm identification and family 
control intentions, among other factors summarized in Figure 1, family firms can estimate the 
effects that family ownership is likely to exert on potential and realized AC through emotional 
attachment. The combination of this knowledge, in turn, might allow them to assess the strength 
of family ownership influence on potential and realized AC, and take effective measures to close 
the motivation and/or implementation gap originating from those effects. 
Our model suggests that both ability and willingness can cause poor performance in 
incorporating and using external knowledge. If the reason for poor AC is lack of willingness, then 
corrective actions could focus on tackling the lack of motivation by introducing a system of 
intrinsic and extrinsic incentives that weaken emotional concerns and stimulate the acquisition, 
assimilation, transformation, and exploitation of external knowledge. Instead, if the cause of poor 
AC is lack of ability, then the corrective actions could be directed at opening up the ownership 
and management of the firm to external actors or more broadly developing socialization 
mechanisms that facilitate the process of incorporating and using external knowledge. 
Moreover, the proposed theoretical model offers some valuable and practical insights with 
regard to ownership tenure and succession. Succession is one of the most important, most 
pressing, and most discussed issue by family firm practitioners. Typical and frequent questions 
relate to when succession should take place. In particular, scholars and practitioners alike have 
debated about the pros and cons of long versus short ownership durations, and early versus late 
successions. Recent succession research (e.g., Hauck and Prügl, 2015) has increasingly focused 
on understanding the effect of succession on innovation, thereby often revealing mixed results. 
Our theoretical framework is useful to practitioners by providing them insights about the 
mechanisms through which ownership duration and succession affect various elements of AC. 
Knowledge about those effects might be highly valuable in firm-specific discussions about when 
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Opportunities for Future Research 
Although our propositions particularly emphasize family ownership, our model also lays the 
groundwork to extend our analysis to other types of owners. While firms owned by families may 
be characterized by particularly high levels of emotions and power, those attributes do not 
exclusively exist for those firms. For instance, state-owned firms might be characterized by 
similar levels of power, and decision-making in foundation-owned firms might also follow non-
rational, or emotional considerations. Hence, constellations of ownership constituencies may be 
positioned at intermediate levels of our model depending on the strength of their emotional 
attachment to the firm and the degree of power concentration. Thus, future work, especially 
empirical studies, should examine the influence of different forms of firm ownership on AC 
including families, business angels, venture capitalists, and large public blockholders such as 
pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, and banks (Connelly et al., 2010; David et al., 
2001; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Kim et al., 2008). For example, pension funds tend to hold shares 
for longer periods than hedge funds (Hoskisson et al., 2002) but may not be emotionally attached 
to the firm. Conversely, in cooperative forms of ownership, owners may have strong social and 
emotional links with the firm but may not have enough power individually to influence the firms’ 
AC. Contrary to the predominant approach in corporate governance research examining the direct 
link between ownership structure and firm behaviors and performance (e.g., Connelly et al., 
2010; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Kim et al., 2008), our analysis suggests that future research would 
benefit from explicitly considering the different mechanisms that influence AC and their 
interaction with other antecedents such as the characteristics of the firm’s existing knowledge 
(Lane et al., 2001), learning relationships (Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009), and environmental 
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Quantitative studies are needed to test the relationships proposed in this paper, including the 
links between family ownership and AC through the mechanisms of emotional attachment and 
power concentration, the role of contingency factors, as well as their potential variations over 
time. Our theoretical framework suggests that emotional attachment and power concentration 
work as inconsistent mediators (MacKinnon, 2008), such that the effects of family ownership 
through emotional attachment and power concentration are opposite. Therefore, the inclusion of 
these variables can help resolve inconsistent or non-significant results in recent studies that have 
either focused on the direct link between family ownership and proxies of AC (e.g., Brinkerink, 
2018) or examined more nuanced relationships that relate to limited aspects of family influence 
and of the AC constructs (e.g., Chirico and Salvato, 2014, who study relational and affective 
factors in relation to knowledge internalization at the family level). Overall, we believe that our 
model provides a more complete picture of the phenomenon, which should result in higher 
predictive power in explaining the family ownership-AC relationship. Thus, we encourage 
researchers to test various levels of “family ownership” and reveal thresholds for the proposed 
effects (contingent on firm type and geographic context). Moreover, it would be interesting to see 
whether mere ownership stakes or voting rights, and potential divergence thereof, affect the 
subsequent emotional attachment and power concentration, and ultimately AC. Additionally, it 
would be particularly interesting to see whether there are any “sweet spots” with regard to family 
ownership, for which the motivational and implementation gaps are comparably low. Moreover, 
it is possible that the proposed relationships turn out non-linear in reality. Empirical research on 
the effects of family ownership on dimensions of firm behavior and performance has oftentimes 
revealed inverse U-shaped relationships (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chirico et al., 2018; Mazzola 
et al., 2013), and similar observations might be found with regard to the relationships between 
emotional attachment and power concentration with AC. In particular, one could expect that, at 
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With regard to quantitatively testing the proposed relationships, researchers might test 
moderated mediation models, preferably collecting and analyzing longitudinal data, and build on 
various existing constructs. For instance, relevant parts of the recently developed socio-emotional 
wealth scales (Debicki et al., 2016) might serve to capture emotional attachment. Similarly, 
relevant parts of the Family Influence Familiness Scale (Frank et al., 2017) may provide valuable 
insights to measure power concentration. With regard to AC, finally, future research can rely on 
established measurement scales (e.g., Ben-Oz and Greve, 2012; Jansen et al., 2005). When 
testing the proposed relationship, besides controlling for ownership duration and generation, 
researchers might also pay attention to various ownership constellations. For instance, it is 
proposed to distinguish between lone founder firms, lone heir firms, and first and later generation 
firms with higher levels of family involvement in ownership and control. Finally, while our 
model focuses on how family owners’ attributes affect firm-level AC, it would be also interesting 
to explore the joint effects of family owners’ attributes in conjunction with different macro-level, 
external factors. For example, while we theorize that negative performance feedbacks are likely 
to moderate the effect of family ownership on AC through emotional attachment, it would be 
interesting to add financial crises into the equation, thereby establishing whether family-owned 
firms are more or less able to absorb and react to changing external conditions by modulating 
their level of potential and realized AC. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We have examined the paradoxical and time-varying influence of family owners on firm AC. By 
identifying two key dimensions, emotional attachment and power concentration, that qualify the 
type of family influence associated with a certain degree of family ownership, our analysis 
introduces the concept of motivation and implementation gaps to explain how family ownership 
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Furthermore, our analysis highlights the need and possibility to master the tension engendered by 
family ownership, emphasizing the role of contingencies and temporal factors. 
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Table 2. Past conceptualizations and components of family owner influence along emotional 
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influence to pursue 
particularistic ends (Chrisman 
et al., 2012; Chua et al., 
1999) 
 Intentions for 
continued family 
control 
 Access to family 
resources  
 Social acceptability of 
the vision held by the 
dominant coalition in 
the family firm 
 Family control of the 
dominant coalition  




Bundle of assets and 
attributes that reside in the 
firm resulting from the 
interaction between the 
family and the business 
(Habbershon et al., 2003; 
Pearson et al., 2008) 
 Family influence on 
the firm’s 
organizational identity  
 Family’s values and 
goals 
 Isomorphic influences 
of the family on the 
firm 
 Social network 
overlaps between 
family and the firm 









community and connections 
(Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 
2005) 
 Pursuit of longevity  
 Intentions to transfer 
the business to the 
next generation 
 Authority and 
autonomy of family 
owners 
 Number and intensity 
of relationships with 











between the family, 
ownership and management 
subsystems in the family firm 
(Gersick et al., 1997; 
Sundaramurthy and Kreiner, 
2008) 
 Image association 
between family and 
business 
 Family culture 
 Use of family funds 
 Decision making 
controlled by family 
 Family members 
involved in strategic 
decisions 
Three Ps  Agency 
theory 
Governance attributes that 
define the authority, 
motivations and 
accountability norms of 
family firms including 
parsimony, personalism and 
particularism (Carney, 2005) 




 Family-firm identity 
 Family owners’ 
particularistic goals 
 Unification of 
ownership and 
management in the 
family 
 Incorporation of 
organizational 









Non-financial aspects of the 
firm that meet the family’s 
affective needs (Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007) 
 Family-firm 
identification  
 Renewal of family 
bonds through 
dynastic succession 
 Ability to exercise 
authority  























DEGREE OF FAMILY 
INFLUENCE












 Family control intentions







P2. Family ownership effects through power concentration 








P7. Duration of family 
ownership




Willingness to acquire, assimilate, transform, and 
exploit external knowledge



























Figure 1. The paradoxical and time-varying effects of family ownership on absorptive capacity










Figure 2. Temporal Evolution of Absorptive Capacity in Firms with Family Ownership
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